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Fault attacks are powerful cryptanalytic tools that are applicable to many types of cryptosystems. Recently, general techniques have been developed which can be used to attack many standard constructions of stream ciphers based on LFSR's. Some more elaborated methods have been invented to attack RC4. These fault attacks are not applicable in general to combiners with memory. In this paper, techniques are developed that specifically allow to attack this class of stream ciphers. These methods are expected to work against any LFSR-based construction that uses only a small memory and few input bits in its output function. In particular, efficient attacks are described against the stream cipher E0 used in Bluetooth, either by inducing faults in the memory or in one of its LFSR's. In both cases, the outputs derived from the faulty runs finally allow to describe the secret key by a system of linear equations. Computer simulations showed that inducing 12 faults sufficed in most cases if about 2500 output bits were available. Another specific fault attack is developed against the stream cipher SNOW 2.0, whose output function has a 64-bit memory. Similar to E 0 , the secret key is finally the solution of a system of linear equations. We expect that one fault is enough if about 2 12 output words are known.
Some Thoughts about Block Ciphers and Stream Ciphers
Erik Zenner Cryptico A/S ez@cryptico.com Block ciphers and stream ciphers are well-known concepts in cryptography. They are encountered in almost all major textbooks, and they form the basis of all known symmetric encryption algorithms. Nonetheless, many misconceptions surround these concepts. Adi Shamir announced in early 2004 that stream ciphers were dead, just to revoke that statement on the SASC workshop and on Asiacrypt 2004. At the SKEW workshop that was held in May 2005 in Aarhus, it turned out that the specialists in stream cipher cryptography do not even agree on what a stream cipher actually is.
Security-wise, things do not look much better. The common perception is that block ciphers (like AES) are more secure than stream ciphers -but are they? In fact, such a statement is comparing apples with oranges, since block ciphers are not used directly for encryption. Instead, they are used in a mode of operation, which is usually a stream cipher that often turns out to be cryptographically weaker than the dedicated stream ciphers themselves.
In this talk, we attempt to clear up some of the conceptional muddle around block and stream ciphers. We will review some definitions and notions of security, point out the true advantages of block and stream ciphers, and advocate a clear use of terminology. Attacks on key exchange by Tree Parity Machines (TPMs) [1] exist that also employ one or more TPMs (e.g. [2] ). An attacker tries to learn the internal state of the interacting parties from observing the publicly communicated outputs of their synchronisation process. The security of the principle has so far only been accessed experimentally in terms of success probabilities of an attacker with respect to the chosen TPM parameters. This contribution suggests to take a different view on the key exchange and the related attacks. The interacting as well as the attacking TPMs are considered to be runners that start a race at different starting lines chosen at random. Although the finish is determined by the choice of the interacting runners, it is unknown to all the runners. The attacking runner has the disadvantage of being slower than the two interacting runners, because he can only chase them and does not interact. In this unusual race, the starting lines can be chosen freely and neither runner knows the starting line of the other runners. A slower attacking runner can thus win by chance, if he picks an advantageous starting line relative to one of the other two runners. In particular, the initial mutual distances between the runners and the attacking runner determine who will win.
Runners
This perspective still leaves one with success probabilities, after all. Yet it allows for fundamental insights in terms of the relation between the initial mutual distances, synchronisation times, success probabilities and thus the discussion of security. Countermeasures against attacks are also motivated: increase the interaction of your runners, slow down the attacking runner or choose close starting lines.
A Framework for Computer Proofs in Probability Theory
for Use in Cryptography Mathematical proofs are often complex and hard to verify by their readers. Consequently, the application of formal proof systems are a useful approach in the area of verification. We present a framework for computer proofs in probability theory. Therefore we describe formalized probability distributions and fundamental lemmata concerning σ-algebras, probability spaces and conditional probabilities. These are given in the formal language of the formal proof system Isabelle/HOL. Besides we describe an application of the presented formalized probability distributions and fundamental lemmata to cryptography. Our achievements are a step towards computer verification of cryptographic primitives. They describe a basis for computer verification in probability theory for interactive proof constructions within the formal proof system mentioned above. Computer verification can be applied to further problems in cryptographic research, if the corresponding basic mathematical knowledge is available in a database. Wort-Multiplikationen zu berechnen.
Hocheffiziente modulare Multiplikation für GF(P )
Die Reduktion lässt sich auch als Multiplikation darstellen: 0 ≤ X ⊙ Y ⊖ P ⊙ Z < P . So kann die beschleunigte Multiplikation auch für die Reduktionsphase eingesetzt werden. Sortiert man die Terme in Reihenfolge absteigender Wertigkeit, ergibt sich
In jedem Schritt wird nur je ein neues z i benötigt, welches zu Beginn jedes Schrittes mit einem Look Ahead-Mechanismus abgeschätzt wird: Die höchstwertigen Terme des i-ten Schrittes -mit Ausnahme der z i enthaltenden Teilterme -werden ausgewertet. Aus dem Ergebnis lässt sich z i mit einer Division durch P errechnen. Als Ersatz für die Division wird eine Multiplikation mit dem Kehrwert der führenden Wörter von P verwendet (ähnlich zu Barrett). Ungenaue z i werden durch Korrekturberechnungen ausgeglichen. Geschickte Parameterwahl ermöglicht es, die Genauigkeit soweit zu erhöhen, dass der Aufwand zur Korrektur ignoriert werden kann (Fehlerwahrscheinlichkeit ≈ 10 −5 ). Für jeden Schritt werden 2 Wort-Multiplikationen für (p i · z i − x i · y i ) und weitere n − 1 für die Summen benötigt. Unsere Implementierung benötigt weiterhin 3 Wort-Multiplikationen für die Auswertung der höchstwertigen Terme und 3 für die Multiplikation mit dem Kehrwert. Als Summe ergibt sich die oben erwähnte Komplexität von n 2 + 7n. 
Angriffe auf RC4

Designing Secure Protocol Implementations
Philipp A. Baer * * University of Kassel, FB 16, FG Distributed Systems, Germany Security network protocols specified in only a formal language normally cannot be translated into software right away, mostly due to missing implementation details. Furthermore, a naïve implementation is often error-prone because of the variety of environmental configurations. We propose the interactive assisted modeling (IAM) architecture for security protocol specification. Its objective is to improve the quality of protocol implementations and portability. The IAM architecture offers detail level-filtered modeling, support for group communication, and optimized code generation. An abstract and platform-independent representation language is introduced to guarantee portability of protocol specifications.
The AIM modeling interface provides an abstract view on the communication scenario and the environment. It furthermore supports specification of environmental properties such as characteristics of the communication media. Third-party tools for protocol and security analysis will also be supported. Projects like [1] follow a similar approach.
Cryptographic or communication primitives and common networking parameters are directly mapped into our representation language. It is similar to MuCAPSL [2] which is primarily targeted towards specification of multicast authentication protocols. The objective of MuCAPSL is protocol analysis whereas our language was explicitly designed for automatic code generation.
In another transformation process a protocol specification is translated into intermediate or native code. The intermediate code target is similar to Microsoft's Intermediate Language (MSIL). An optimized interpreter executes this code (communication sandboxing). 
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Improved Boomerang Attack on Eight-Round-Serpent
Anne Schwalb Mathematisches Institut Justus-Liebig-Universität Giessen, Germany a.schwalb@gmx.de
One of the five AES finalists is the block cipher Serpent (see [ABK98] ) which is a 32-round SP-network.
In the beginning of this talk a short introduction to this cipher is given. Then the boomerang attack on 8-round-Serpent is presented as an extension of the differential cryptanalysis. The boomerang attack is a key-recovery attack which needs chosen-plaintexts and adaptive-chosen-ciphertexts.
Both, the differential cryptanalysis and the boomerang attack, use characteristics. Since for the efficiency of the attack it is important that the used characteristics have a probability as high as possible, an introduction to differential characteristics is also given as a component of the boomerang attack.
As a novel contribution, the attack on the 8-round-Serpent as given in [KKS00] is improved by using a characteristic with a probability higher than the one used there. This better characteristic is taken from [BDK01] .
The attack presented in [KKS00] requires 2 128 chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts (which means the entire codebook), 2 133 bytes of memory and time equivalent to approximately 2 163 8-round-Serpent-encryptions. The new attack which uses the better characteristic from [BDK01] also works with the entire codebook, which means it also requires 2 128 chosen plaintexts and ciphertexts and 2 133 bytes of memory but it decreases the required time to approximately 2 159 8-round-Serpent-encryptions. To the best of our knowledge this new attack is the best published attack on 8-round-Serpent. Stream ciphers are widely used for online-encryption of arbitrarily long data. An important class of stream ciphers are combiners with memory, with the E 0 generator from the Bluetooth standard for wireless communication [2] being their most prominent example. E 0 consists of 4 driving devices, a finite state machine (FSM) C with a 4 bit state, an output function f and a memory update function δ. At each clock, one keystream bit z t is produced from the output X t ∈ {0, 1} 4 of the driving devices and the current state C t ∈ {0, 1} 4 of the FSM according to z t = f (C t , X t ), and the state of the FSM is updated to C t+1 := δ(C t , X t ).
Wiedererkennung anonymer Knoten
So far, the best publicly known attacks against combiners with memory are correlation attacks [4] and algebraic attacks [1] . Correlation attacks exploit linear equations L(X t , . . . , X t+r−1 , z t , . . . , z t+r−1 ) = 0 that are true with some probability 1 2 + λ with λ = 0. Algebraic attacks use valid nonlinear equations of preferably low degree to describe the secret key by a system of equations.
We show how to avert a special class of correlation attacks [3] that is currently the most effective against E 0 and introduce a general design principle which guarantees that all valid equations have a degree not smaller than a certain lower bound. Combining these results, we construct a slightly modified version of E 0 with significantly improved resistance against correlation attacks and algebraic attacks.
